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Preface
The momentous events of 1989-1991 marked the end of the Soviet Union
and, as a result, its threat to the interests of the free world. One of those
free-world interests was-and is-the ability to use the planet's seas and oceans
on all lawful occasions. Another is not to be threatened by hostile seaborne
forces.
Though most ships of the old Soviet fleet still exist, the political will to use
them as the old rulers used them has vanished. Now an impoverished and
geographically, demographically, and industrially reduced Russia has difficulty
even in maintaining the visible shells of its former naval might.
With its only rival at sea self-humbled, the United States now has unchal
lenged maritime superiority and, as part of that, presumptive blue-water sea
control. Other nations may subject us to harassment at sea in a regional
contingency, but any country's ability to build a serious blue-water challenge
would take years and enormous expense.
Alfred Thayer Mahan argued that control of the seas was a worthy goal, and
he devoted most of his writing on how to achieve that end. Now that we hold
unchallenged presumptive sea control, we must reach beyond Mahan's mark
and develop new and appropriate ways to protect our country's interests. Most
of those ways will be to affect people and events above the high-water mark.
Late in 1991, the National Command Authority published a new national
}
security strategy that stressed a regional rather than a global approach. Shortly
thereafter the Joint Chiefs of Staff (JCS) issued a new national military strategy
2
which also stresses a regional approach. The new military strategy has as its
basis four fundamental legs: forward presence, crisis response, strategic deter
rence, and reconstitution. This study examines the naval strategic contribution
to each of those legs.
Now more than half a decade old, the Goldwater-Nichols Act strengthened
both the unified Commanders in Chief (CinCs) and the Chairman of the Joint
Chiefs of Staff. Its influence is becoming ever more apparent and is bringing
about profound change in the way the U.S. naval services do business. Service
chiefs are now providers of forces to the warfighting regional commanders. The
underlying reality here is that Service strategic policy formulation, doctrine,

and force structure are both more joint and more customer-oriented than before.
The reality that they must continue on that course is explored in this study.
Late in 1991, the Secretary of the Navy directed the Chief of Naval Opera
tions

(CNO)

and the Commandant of the Marine Corps

naval force capabilities planning effort

(CMC)

(NFCPE) to determine a

to convene a

new strategic

direction for the naval services. The document that resulted is titled ..... From
the Sea." It includes several bold new steps in designing a suitable naval strategy
and its corresponding doctrine; however, it is merely a first step. Much more
needs to be done if we are to succeed in creating a naval capability truly in step
with the times. This study uses" ... From the Sea" as a departure point to make
the recommendations that this author believes are necessary to flesh out that
document and make the concepts found in it work. 3

viii

Forward Presence
What Is Forward Presence and Why Do We Need It? Forward presence
operations were once a "lesser included case" within the concept of a global
containment policy. This policy was largely implemented through a strategy of
forward defense against the threat of aggression from the Communist bloc. An
extensive network of bases supported the forward deployments. Together they
were regarded as our first line of defense against Soviet expansionism. While
the regional stability that resulted from such endeavors was necessary to support
the strategy, it remained a secondary consideration of that strategy.
The collapse of the Soviet Union and the subsequent absence of a true global
superpower threat ended the need for a worldwide containment strategy but led
to the need for both regional national security and military strategies. The nature
of this new environment is also characterized by a significant decrease in the
4
availability of forward bases worldwide. However, U.S. planners realize that
a strong forward presence is required in order to nurture stability on a region
by-region basis; hence, forward presence has become one of the four founda
5
tions of the new U.S. National Military Strategy. There are three major areas
of endeavor in which forward presence will be vital to regional stability:

Prevention. The old adage, "an ounce of prevention is worth a pound of
cure" is highly applicable here. Prevention is a function of deterrence plus early
reaction. Should deterrence fail, early reaction can prevent a minor crisis from
growing into a major one. Perhaps the most striking example of forward
presence as a deterrent is the long-standing U.S. presence in Western Europe,
which symbolizes resolve and the inevitability of immediate escalation should
an act of aggression bring the perpetrator into direct conflict with the United
States. During the early stages of the Cold War, the U.S. presence in Europe
was used as a "trip wire" that threatened the Soviet Union with a massive
6
nuclear response should it invade Western Europe. Later, more emphasis was
'
placed on conventional forces and the concept of global forward defense. With
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the dissolution of the Soviet Union, many in the United States saw the potential
to withdraw U.S. forces from Europe; interestingly enough, we are now finding
that a U.S. presence in Europe as well as in other regions is still considered to
be a stabilizing factor by regional leaders there.
This is true also in the Middle East and the Pacific Rim, where continued
U.S. presence encourages regional stability, perhaps because the United States
often serves as an "honest broker" among the leaders of nations who are, by
heritage, extremely suspicious of one another.
How effective is deterrence? While it is always difficult to prove the negative
case, we know that in areas such as Korea and Western Europe, where the
United States has shown clear and unambiguous resolve, that resolve has never
been tested. In 1950, when we led others to believe South Korea was outside
our defensive perimeter and thus of little concern to us, the result was a costly
war. In the summer of 1990, the United States sent ambiguous signals about
what it might do if Kuwait were invaded by Iraq. And so, even though we had
naval presence in the area, our resolve was tested quickly by Saddam Hussein,
who mistakenly perceived a lack of resolve; and,just as in Korea in 1950, war
resulted-a conflict that might otherwise have been avoided. The deterrent
effect of forward presence is a function of the credibiility of that presence and
the perception of resolve emanating from Washington. If either is perceived to
be lacking, the deterrent effect is diminished.
If a crisis cannot be deterred, there are situations in which the judicious and
prompt use of forces forward will contain a crisis and prevent escalation. Some
critics of the U.S. conduct of the 1975 Mayaguez crisis believe that the prompt
use of U.S. force probably averted a long-term hostage crisis similar to those
the nation endured following the capture of the USS Pueblo in 1968 and of the
U.S. Embassy in Teheran in 1979. The use of non-combatant evacuation
operations

(NEOs)

has almost certainly saved the lives of many American

citizens over the years. In the last two decades, NEOs have been conducted by
forward deployed naval forces in diverse places such as Vietnam, Cyprus,
Yemen, Lebanon, Liberia, and Somalia. The general trend toward localized
instability and problems of governance throughout the world indicates that

NEOs will be conducted more frequently in the future.
Although not generally associated with vital U.S. interests, the ability to use
forward presence forces to conduct humanitarian operations has been a for
tunate by-product of forward presence operations. Recent humanitarian opera
tions in Somalia, Bangladesh, the Philippines, and Kurdistan have been
successful in demonstrating an American commitment to, and rapid responsive
ness in, helping friends in need.

2

Anderson

The early use of our forward presence forces in Somalia and Iraq in late 1992
and 1993 to react quickly to a developing crisis are good examples here. The
traditional forward presence mix of carrier battle group, ARG/MEU, and MPS
were the initial naval components of the U.S. response.
In addition, the active participation of U.S. military forces in the war on drugs
has become a prominent element of forward presence in several regions. The
United States is now gaining enough experience in these operations to develop
a sense for the kind of skills and force structure needed in each region. These
operations appear to work well in areas where we have chosen to apply them
(and they are exhibiting benefits that outweigh the costs).

Access to Resources and Markets. Another argument for conducting
forward presence operations to preserve stability is that it protects continued
U.S. access to resources and ensures stable markets for U.S. trade. It is unfair
to say that the United States went to war in 1991 solely to ensure access to
Middle East oil. Nevertheless, if the oil supply were under the control of a
hostile power, the U.S. strategic-economic position would be severely under
mined. There is no way to prove that the Gulf war could have been prevented
by a more aggressive and visible forward presence in that region, but there is a
growing body of evidence to substantiate that the prevention of a crisis is critical
to preserving the economic well-being of a nation. Professor Richard N.
Cooper, a Harvard economist and pioneer of this premise, reasons that there
was a direct correlation between the 1991-1992 recession and the crisis in the
8
Gulf. The point to be made here is that avoiding a crisis saves money by
avoiding the kind of recessionary impact which Professor Cooper discusses.
By concluding that a crisis led to recession in the Gulf case, Professor Cooper
indirectly begs a comparison with the absence of recession in 1987-1988 when
the United States forcefully and decisively reflagged Kuwaiti tankers and
adequately protected them with an enhanced U.S. forward naval presence.
Despite several shooting incidents, no real crisis evolved, and no recession
creating oil price hikes resulted as it did in 1973 and 1979 when real or imagined
oil supply crises occurred. It would appear that the perception of stability can
be as important as its actual existence.
In the Far East, stability is considered a vital regional issue. Public
pronouncements of leaders such as Lee Quan Yew of Singapore stress that
9
fact. The point is made even more forcefully by people from abroad who visit
the United States or live here for business purposes. The Japanese are particular
ly concerned with sustaining an ongoing U.S. presence to preserve regional
IO
stability.
Nations in that part of the world that are mutually suspicious
maintain bilateral security agreements with the United States. This tends to
ameliorate local animosities and suspicions. These bilateral agreements and the

3
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presence of the U. S. Seventh Fleet and other U. S. military units tend to temper
regional antagonisms.
But what good does this stability provide the U.S. taxpayer? The answer is,
regional stability encourages regional prosperity. The Economist recently ob
served-as have many other news media-that the Far East is the fastest
growing economic market in the world.

11

This is crucial to American workers

who desperately seek overseas markets for their products; the markets exist,
and it behooves us to invest in their growth. In 1991, U.S. exports to the region
12
grew by 20 percent. That figure is expected to continue increasing as U.S.
manufacturers seize opportunities to cater to the newly affluent Far East
consumers. Stable foreign markets mean jobs at home.
In the Third World, coalition-building is perceived as a slow, long-tenn
process. The bilateral alliances that the United States has built in both the
Mid-East and the Far East are considered by some as the seeds of future standing
regional coalitions. However, the potting soil for those seeds is U.S. forward
presence. Without that presence, with its web of bilateral arrangements,
regional security mechanisms will probably not sprout. This long-tenn invest
ment in regional security will eventually enable us to greatly reduce the naval
forces committed to these regions as our presence is replaced largely by
coalition partners. Unlike the immediate and precipitous flight from forward
presence advocated by some, this long-tenn plan will avoid our having to
"reinvent the wheel" as we have done again and again in the Middle East and
Europe. The current evolution of Nato into a coalition in which U.S. troops will
not be the primary military force did not occur quickly. Coalition-building is a
long-tenn investment.
This concept for regional security requires patience in addition to the
long-tenn approach to coalition building. It also requires a short-tenn invest
ment in continued forward presence, which will ultimately pay off handsomely
if handled properly. The use of forward-deployed U.S. forces to encourage
long-tenn multinational confidence-building measures is a low investment for
a future with high return potential. In both Korea and Europe, U.S. forces have
provided both the nucleus around which successful security structures have
been built and the glue to hold them together. Our current ability to draw down
U.S. forces is a measure of success, not retrenchment.
The key to this long-tenn process of using our web of bilateral agreements
to build future coalitions is the participation of forward presence forces in
bilateral exercises. Many of these exercises are naval in character. USCentCom,
in particular, is being extremely innovative in its use of the Marine expedition
ary unit, special operations capable
phibious ready group

(ARG),

(MEU[SOC]),

with its associated am

as a non-intrusive tool for conducting an
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aggressive bilateral exercise program in its area of concern, while simul
taneously encouraging multilateral exercises as a step toward regional collec
tive security. In this manner, the advantage of coalition building becomes a
welcome by-product of an already needed forward presence mission.
Is Forward Presence Really Vital? How important is forward presence com

pared to crisis response? We may liken presence to the cop on the beat deterring
crime on the scene, and crisis response to a police policy that, from a centralized
location, reacts to a crime in progress. It is much less expensive to prevent a
crisis than it is to react to one. Of course, if a crisis erupts anyway, one must
act swiftly and forcibly. The events in the Persian Gulf in 1990-1991 illustrate
this. Neither forward presence nor crisis response is more important than the
other, and neither is complete without the other.
The Naval Aspects of Forward Presence. The announced policy of the U.S.

military for the next decade is to reduce overseas basing while simultaneously
maintaining an active forward presence in those regions where it is vital to U.S.
national securityY The most obvious candidate for carrying out most such
missions will be our naval forces; by naval, we speak of both Navy and Marine
Corps forces. A look at the proposed composition of forces articulated in the
new National Military Strategy confirms this, as outlined in figure 1.

Speaking to the staff of III Marine Expeditionary Force (MEF) in Okinawa

in 1989, shortly after he assumed command, Lieutenant General (then Major
General) H. C. Stackpole ill stated the need for forward presence forces to be
14
credible, sustainable, and flexible.
That statement remains relevant today,
although given today's technology, this does not necessarily mean a large
ground force. The new National Military Strategy does not necessarily call for
our forces to defend forward, but it definitely rejects the notion that such forces
ls
be a mere "trip wire." General Carl Mundy, Commandant of the U.S. Marine
Corps, foresees that these naval elements will provide the capability for U.S.
joint reaction forces to respond in a timely fashion should deterrence or
containment of a crisis fail or should a disaster require rapid, self-sustained
16
relief forces.
This enabling function provides impetus to the concepts of
credibility, sustainability, and flexibility articulated by Lieutenant General
Stackpole. For example, in 1990, Marine Corps maritime prepositioning forces
(MPF) provided the first credible and sustainable U.S. ground forces in Saudi
Arabia. Within twenty days of the beginning of the deployment, over 33,000
Marines, complete with armor and aircraft, were deployed in Saudi Arabia with
thirty days of supplies and equipment. Some of these supplies sustained Army
and Air Force units until their supplies arrived in September. The basic

5
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Force Composition

I

Strategic

I

Anny

Bombers
Missiles

I

�
I
I
I
USMC

Air Force

n.n

BASEmB�E

8-52 + B-1

B-S2H + B-1 + B-2

1000

550

SS8Ns

34

Active

16 Divisions

12 Divisions

Reserve

10 Divisions

6 Divisions

18

2 Divisions

Cadre
Ships
Active
Reserve
Active
Reserve

530 (IS CV8Gs)

450 (12 CV8Gs)

13 Air Wings

11 Air Wings

2 Air Wings

2 Air Wings

3MEFs

3MEFs

1 D1vlslon/Wlng

1 Divlsion/Wlng

Supports Forward
Deployed Forces.

One MEF Forward
Deployed; others In
support

Active

22FWE

ISFWE

Reserve

12FWE

11 FWE

CVBG: Carrier Battle Group

MEF: Marine Expeditionary Force

FWE: Fighter Wing Equivalent

Source: Adapted from draft document of the National Military Strategy. September 1991.
Figure

I

capabilities required to introduce these key concepts into each of the three
regions are listed below.

Credibility. Because of the general need to gain and maintain air superiority,
and given our desire to reduce overeseas basing, it is necessary to keep an
aircraft carrier (or its equivalent) in each of the three vital regions. But, as a
result of the demise of the fonner Soviet Union and the resulting reduced threat
to our carriers, in most cases the number of escorts that each carrier needs may
be reduced.
The presence of a carrier battle group or a similar capability is as much a
political signal of U.S. interest in the region as it is a military instrument. This
visible manifestation of U.S. power and resolve reassures allies and keeps
potential adversaries warned of the consequences of their actions. For the near
tenn, an aircraft carrier group, or a like capability, along with an

(SOC),

and an

MPS

ARG/MEU

appear to be the bottom line of forward presence in the

Mediterranean, Persian Gulf region, and WestPac.

Flexibility. The flexibility necessary to implement the National Military
Strategy from a forward presence perspective resides largely in the capability
of the

ARG/MEU(SOC).

MEU(SOC) are
MEU(SOC) to contribute

The eighteen mission profiles of the

listed in figure 2. These mission profiles allow the

substantially in responding quickly to a minor crisis before it becomes

6
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MAGTF Mission ProfIles and Strategic Niches
Marine Expeditionary Unit (Special Operations Capable) [MEU(SOC)]. The MEU(SOC) is

the Marine Corps' primary instrument for forward presence operations. Aside from being forward

deployed to demonstrate U.S. interest and resolve in a region, it has the capability to carry out
the following mission profiles in order to protect U.S. interests by quickly dealing with. or

containing, a lesser regional contingency:
•

Military operations in urban

Reinforcement operations

•

Security operations

Deception operations

•

Show of force

Fire support control operations

•

Civil Affairs operations

Counterintelligence operations

•

Clandestine recovery operations

•

In extremis hostage rescue

•

Specialized demolitions

•

Non-combatant evacuations

•

Tactical recovery of aircraft and

•

Amphibious raids

•

Limited objective attacks

•
•
•
•

terrain

(NE0s)

personnel (TRAP)
(Although not a SOC capability, MEUs
operations.)

Source: Data

can

(MOUl)

•

Shipboarding operations

•

Electronic warfare operations

•

Gas/oil platfonn seizure

assist in the conduct of humanitarian assistance

from advertised Marine Capabilities in Headquarters u.s. Marine Corps publications.
Figure

2

uncontrollable. The capability to conduct opposed NEOs is particularly attrac
tive in an era of increasing governance problems.
Although not currently listed as among the missions to be performed by an

ARG/MEU(SOC), such a force can conduct humanitarian ass istance/disaster
relief operations as shown by the Bangladesh episode in 1991 and that in
Somalia in 1992-1993. This sea-based capability gives U . S. policymakers
greater flexibility than alternative options do.

In addition, the ARG/MEU (SOC) can use the flexibility offered by sea-basing
to begin building multilateral military cooperation from the existing web of
bilateral agreements in the Middle East and the Pacific Rim. The non-intrusive
ness offered by sea-basing allows the ARG/MEU(SOC) the versatility to exercise
at sea and in the air with one partner, while conducting an amphibious exercise
with another in an overall coalition-like manner, without forcing the potentially
contentious issues that would emerge in conventional multilateral ground
exercises.

SustainabiJity. The fmal leg of this forward presence triad is the capacity to
sustain forces up front during the initial stages of a crisis. In this respect,
sustainability becomes the first manifestation of the enabling bridge between

7

The Newport Papers

forward presence and crisis response. It is not limited to the expertise of naval
forces to sustain themselves; it also facilitates the capability to support other
forces flowing into theater in the early stages of a crisis, such as in 1990 when
Marine and Navy forces logistically supported Anny and Air Force units
extensively during the first week of Operation Desert Shield.17
Having sustainable forward deployed forces in regions where we have vital
interests will provide special challenges in an era of dwindling forward basing.
In a speech in Indonesia on 30 April 1991, then U.S. Secretary of Defense
Richard Cheney reaffinned that the United States would look for means other
18
than basing to support forward presence operations. Commander Barry
Coombs of the Naval War College has investigated this area and maintains that
"while current basing is adequate for peacetime forward presence operations,
surge or extended operations may be difficult to support from the logistics
standpoint. Innovative solutions for logistics support to combat forces are
required in view of basing losses. These solutions may rest in expanded
prepositioning, increased Navy use of strategic sealift and contract commercial
assets , stronger host nation support (HNS) agreements, or in enhancing the
scope of the Combat Logistics Force. .. 19
The maritime prepositioning force (MPF) program provides one of the key
elements in General Mundy's enabling bridge concept. Although the entire MPF
operation can best be viewed as a crisis action mechanism, the fact that the ships
of the maritime prepositioning squadrons (MPS), which actually carry the heavy
equipment for the MPF, are forward deployed in the region, makes MPS a de
facto forward presence asset. Figure 3 is a description of the MPF concept for
readers not familiar with the program. To fully demonstrate its capability, the
MPF should be exercised frequently as part of the overall U.S. program to
support alliances and bilateral agreements.
In forums and war games conducted since the end of the Gulf War, there has
been a general consensus among strategic thinkers that had the maritime
prepositioning squadron (MPS) from Diego Garcia been moved early in the
crisis before the invasion of Kuwait, the signal of U.S. resolve, with adequate
attendant publicity, might have altered the Iraqi course of action. It is true that
there is some question whether the Iraqis were capable of accurately assessing
MPF capability in order to properly read the signal. Both of these arguments
point toward more aggressive use of the MPF as a forward presence tool in
non-crises. An extensive program of exercise offloads would demonstrate the
program's capability in defensively reinforcing threatened friends as well as its
ability to enhance our offensive amphibious capability. Both U.S. Commander
in Chief Pacific Command (USCinCPac) and U.S. Commander in Chief Central
2O
Command (USCinCCent)have embarked on such programs.
8
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MPFCONCEPT

J. R. Nunes, j.

Source: Redrawn from U,S. Marine Corps Operations Handbook 1-5.
Figure 3

What Is New in the Regional Approach? Thus far in this discussion, naval
forces in the new world order probably look much like naval forces in the Cold
War. On the surface, this is true; the day-to-day capabilities that are needed in
a region to cover the range of stability requirements that have been discussed
do appear familiar, but surface appearances can indeed be deceiving. During
the Cold War, it was necessary for our forces to be reasonably concentrated in
order to be prepared for battle, which theoretically could have erupted at any
time. Carriers generally needed constant escort, and they maintained a high
level of combat readiness at all times. Day-to-day, region-by-region, the
situation has changed. A much higher degree of independent steaming is
allowable, and carriers will not require all the combat capabilities of a CBVG
all of the time.
A higher degree of independent steaming will allow naval forces to "show

the flag" in more ports and in more peacetime exercises than was previously
possible, while continuing to maintain the preparedness of naval force packages
that are necessary to concentrate quickly to deal with brewing crises. Some

9
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planners liken this capability to a soccer game where well-drilled team members
spread out to play their positions until a friendly scoring opportunity or
opposition threat requires a combination of players to deal with the situation.
Once the situation has passed, the players resume their original positions. Figure
4 illustrates this concept.
The playing field in figure 4 is superimposed on a map that transcends two
CinCs' boundaries in order to show the need to make boundaries between fleet
l
CinCs much more permeable than they have been? This is a fundamental
change occurring since the Goldwater-Nichols military reform legislation
passed in the mid-eighties. The regional warfighting CinCs are the employers
of forces, while the Services act as providers. The Services would be ill-advised
to put themselves in a position of telling the warfighting CinC that he cannot
have a certain force package in a timely manner due to geographic internal
Service constraints; thus, the requirement for increasing permeability of boun
daries.
Finally, regionalization may well mean that forward presence force packages
can be closely tailored to suit regional peculiarities. For example, an MEU(SOC)
in the Middle East may be built around mobile assets, such as the light armored
vehicle, to allow for substantial distances which may have to be traveled over
the ground. In addition, the absence of a high-intensity Soviet air and submarine
threat may, in most regions, allow for a greater number of attack aircraft aboard
carriers (at the expense of ASW aircraft) in order to counter the criticism in
some quarters that the Navy did not bring enough "air-to-mud" capability to
the theater during Operation Desert Storm. Some regional situations may
actually allow us to combine functions of the ARG and CBVG or the ARG and

MPS should the need arise.
The Role of Naval Forward Presence in Alliance Maintenance and Coali
tion-Building. Naval forces play an extensive role in maintaining our alliances

and bilateral agreements worldwide. The majority of this effort is in the form
of comprehensive exercise programs, the size and scope of which vary from
region to region. Given the demise of the Soviet Union as a superpower threat,
Nato exercises in Europe can be expected to decrease. The number of bilateral
exercises in the Middle East, particularly in the Persian Gulf, has expanded
exponentially as a result of the 1991 war. In the Pacific, we can expect the
number of exercises to remain steady or even increase in the event we begin
doing bilateral work with the Russians. We have not designed regional force
structure around exercise programs, but in the future we need to ensure that we
have sufficient assets to participate fully in exercises that support alliances and
bilateral agreements. This is particularly important in the Middle East and

10
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Boundaries Between Fleet CinCs

J,A. �uoes, Jr

Source: Redrawn from Secretary of the Navy draft Force Capabilities Planning Effort, dated February
1992. Concept introduced by Colonel Mike Strickland, USMC.
Figure 4

Pacific Rim where we are attempting to build our web of bilateral agreements
into lasting, standing multinational mechanisms.

Recommendations. The naval services must develop, for each of the unified
CinCs, forward presence force packages sufficient both to maintain stability in
their region and to assure the CinCs that they can count on the naval share of
these forces that would be needed to handle crises should such arise. The mix
of capabilities will be distinctive to each region. The variables will include
forces for drug interdiction and for exercises in support of alliances and bilateral
agreements. However, in the three regions deemed to be of vital interest to the
United States, several core capabilities are essential. These are: a CBVG-like
capability on station constantly or nearly so; an ARG/MEU(SOC)-like capability;
and an MPS and suitable afloat forward sea-based sustainability. The last of
these is necessary to support the transition to crisis response.
Each region should have a standing expeditionary naval headquarters in
order to furnish the necessary local expertise for command and control of naval
expeditionary forces

(NEFs).

Such headquarters, which would replace the

current numbered fleets, would consist of balanced operational Navy-Marine
Corps staffs as outlined in figure 5. Command would alternate between Navy

11
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Balanced Operational Navy-Marine Corps StatTs

I

I

I

Cine

I

CIaC

NEF

NEF

COMMANDER

COMMANDER

NED
COMMANDER

I

SEA MANEUVER

I
LAND MANEUVER

SEA MANEUVER

LAND MANEUVER

ELEMENT

ELEMENT

ELEMENT

ELEMENT

Source:

1

SUPPORT

SUPPORT

ELEMENT

ELEMENT

Redrawn from February 1991 draft Force Capabilities Planning Effort (unpublished White Paper).

This draft eventually resulted in M •

• •

From the Sea, published by the Secretary of the Navy late in 1992.

FIgureS

and Marine Corps officers. The staff would have a heavier regional political
military orientation than today's numbered fleets.

As illustrated on the left of figure 5, the naval expeditionary force, with its
three primary elements, would be organized administratively and for combat
in a major regional contingency. For day-to-day forward presence operations

it would use deployed naval expeditionary task forces as shown on the right of
the diagram. Each could be a miniature representation of the NEF, although
some might look like the conventional ARGs, MPS, and carrier battle groups
that we deploy today . In all cases, they would employ a "blue-green" staff mix.
Finally, boundaries between fleet CinCs should become much more perme
able, and standardized doctrine should be developed at a joint naval (Navy
Marine Corps) doctrine center.
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Crisis Response
Desert Storm Is Not Necessarily the Future. In 1967 the Israeli anned forces

easily defeated the combined forces of their Arab opponents in a six-day
campaign. For six years thereafter, Israel was generally considered to be the
premier military power in the Middle East; most observers felt that the Arabs
lacked the technological sophistication and military skill to challenge the
Israelis seriously. The Egyptians and Syrians did not accept this evaluation.
They carefully gathered lessons learned from the 1967 war and used the
advantages of emerging technologies to overcome the qualitative Israeli supe
riority in tank and air crews. The Israelis had become complacent, and they paid
the price for their overconfidence.

In a surprise attack in 1973, the Egyptians and the Syrians struck. Using
anti-tank and anti-aircraft missiles and well-drilled assault troops, the Arabs
crossed into territory occupied by the Israelis and established bridgeheads that,
22
for a time, they succeeded in defending. Although the Israelis rallied from
their initial suprise and achieved a tactical and operational victory, the strategic
results led to peace talks that constitute what the Arabs have always considered
23
to be a moral victory.
Just as in 1967, the U.S. -led coalition victory over Iraq in 1991 is viewed by
some in the United States and abroad as a seminal event in military history and
the beginning of an era of unchallenged U.S. military superiority. To accept
this viewpoint without reservation may well be as dangerous as was the postwar
Israeli overconfidence in 1967-1973.
We must assume that potential future adversaries, the Iraqis included, will

refuse to accept the verdict of Desert Stonn as conclusive proof of unchallenged
U.S. military superiority. We must assume further that these potential future
adversaries are studying the 1991 results as carefully as the Egyptians and
Syrians studied those of 1967.
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How would an opponent such as Iraq attempt to deal with us by learning
from Desert Shield and Desert Storm? His first moves would probably be
political acts to deny us basing and overflight rights from neighbors of his
intended victim. This would foreclose our ability to repeat our long force
buildup in Saudi Arabia prior to Operation Desert Storm. Next, an aggressor
would be well advised to accumulate sufficient "state-of-the art" technology to
deny us sea control near his littoral waters to ensure that we cannot get close
enough to conduct power projection, particularly in the form of amphibious
operations. If a future opponent could replicate a modem technological
equivalent of the kind of point defense that the fortifications of Charleston,
South Carolina,

provided during the Civil War-and Charleston was the

Union's greatest naval frustration of that war-he might well put U.S. leaders
in a situation where the price to be paid exceeds the value to be gained through
24
He would also mine nearby choke points, such as the Strait

military action.

of Hormuz, which we would need to get U.S. forces to the theater. He would
probably try to preemptively attack the ports and airfields through which we
would attempt a DesertShield-type buildup. This might be done through the
use of special operations, chemical weapons, or even nuclear weapons. Jam
ming or otherwise denying us the satellite communications links so vital in
Desert Shield and Desert Storm would be a logical step as well. Once theUnited
States is denied a base of operations in the area, the aggressor could pick off
his victim and attempt to consolidate his gains quickly, before we could react.
He could hope to render aU.S. response too expensive to contemplate. We must
consider how we would have reacted in Saudi Arabia had access to Dhahran
and Jubail been denied us. In the case of an Iraqi or Iranian action, it might well
be that a diplomatic settlement extorted from the Gulf Cooperation Council
states would effectively freeze us out of the Middle East.
The Naval Dimension. With the possible exception of the first step, the

worst-case adversary strategy described above would be aimed at denying us
both the naval bridge to, and the door into, the theater of operations. In all
probability, most potential adversaries realize that they probably cannot stand
up to the array of power that faced Iraq after six months ofU.S. military buildup
in Saudi Arabia. Considering that, they probably will not even try to do so; thus,
the strategy of denying us the buildup in the first place. Given the choice
between negotiations on unfavorable terms or having to fight their way back
into the theater, some players simulating theU.S. national leadership in seminar
war games on this subject have chosen to negotiate at unfavorable terms to U.S.
and allied interests, with all of the negative implications of so doing. Stated
25
simply, we surrendered.
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Given current amphibious ship decommissioning projections, it is conceiv
able that if the u.s. forces on the ground were overrun early, we would not have
enough amphibious assault or follow-on shipping to re-enter the Arabian
peninsula between the years 1997 and 2000 .

In either case, the protection of our enabling bridge into the theater, or the
need to "kick down the door" should that bridge be disrupted, is primarily a
naval function. The capabilities needed will be endangered if we shape the
post-Cold War Navy as we shaped it to meet a blue-water threat. The results
of Desert Stonn indicate that our naval littoral capability needs considerable
work if it is truly to become the naval focus of effort in the coming years. Our
capability to clear mines in a timely manner was shown to be woefully
26
Similarly, our ability to conduct strike operations from aircraft

inadequate.

carriers in support of ground troops was far below that required. Further, our
shallow water antisubmarine warfare capability is currently poor-to-nonex
istent. Finally, as we have seen, our ability to enter forcibly anywhere will be
27
uncertain if present amphibious force projections are not improved.
At all costs we should ensure that our naval forces can provide our national
leaders with viable and acceptable options with which to overcome the kind of
strategic challenge posed by the hypothetical enemy described above.
The Desert Storm That Did Not Happen. In Washington today, it is
fashionable, particularly among Congressional thinkers, to express future force
structure in Desert Stonn equivalents. This is a convenient budgetary tool; in
strategic tenns, however, these equivalents mean little if our naval enabling
bridge is disrupted before we enter into a Desert Stonn-type position. The
ability to prevent that from happening is not only a function of numbers of ships,
it is also a function of the kinds of ships we have. We must ensure that among
them will be enough with the capabilities for intelligence and command and
control infrastructure. That depends on decisions in the fields of strategy,
doctrine, and force structure.
The Civil War Analogy. The U.S. Navy's great sea control conflict was World
War II. In the Pacific, the Navy battled a Japanese fleet that in the early stages
of the war came very close to victory and that remained a fonnidable threat
until the last year of the conflict. In the Atlantic and European theaters, the
Gennans opposed the Allies with a naval force designed more to deny us free
use of the sea than to use it themselves. Much the same was true in World War
I. In the Spanish-American War, although the Spanish fleet was second-rate,
the United States Navy was forced to deal with it before undertaking other
military operations. When sea control is not presumptive, all other requirements,
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including power projection, will be hazardous until the issue of sea control has
been resolved.
When sea control is presumptive, it is a different matter entirely. Sea control
can be presumed when the foe either has no ability to contest control or does
not wish to risk its forces in such a contest. We fought our war with Mexico,
the Korean War, the Vietnam War, and the war with Iraq with at least
presumptive sea control. The difficulty has been in translating sea power into
action capable of directly influencing events ashore. The United States has
normally addressed this issue through a combination of blockade and power
projection.
The United States enjoyed presumptive sea control during the Civil War,
although in a different way from some of the cases discussed above because,
for the most part, the United States had to acquire its advanced bases by taking
them from the enemy. Once that was done, Union naval forces could begin to
influence events ashore. In Vietnam, Korea, and in Desert Shield and Desert
Storm, the United States had unopposed access to bases ashore very close to
the fighting fronts. In the future, the United States may fmd itself in a situation
more resembling that of the Civil War than those of more recent times.

In the Civil War, the purpose of the naval expeditionary campaigns was to
influence directly events ashore; this meant that the targets for naval campaign
ing were primarily on land. Realizing this, Confederate strategists hardened the
most obvious landing locations with field fortifications, built ironclads, and
depended on mobile reserves to deal with Federal attempts at deep amphibious
operations such as the Peninsula Campaign.
From the perspective of the U.S. strategists, the two primary tools of the
Federal Navy during the Civil War were the blockade and the amphibious thrust
to seize key points and to tie down Confederate troops. Though relying on
advanced bases usually seized from the foe, blockading was mainly an out

growth of sea control, whereas Federal power projection efforts were primarily
naval expeditionary efforts, using the Army as the ground part of the effort.
There were three primary methods of reducing the Confederate point
defenses. The first was to pound them into submission, which worked at
Port Royal and Fort Henry but failed at Charleston and Fort Donelson. Next
was to run by them and-if necessary-attack them from the rear, as was done
at Mobile Bay and New Orleans. The third method was to land troops where
the Confederates were weak and envelop the target from another direction. This
was accomplished at Vicksburg but failed in the Peninsula Campaign.
The parallel with the present situation is three-fold. First, the Union's leaders
in the Civil War faced a situation in which they obtained presumptive sea
control with a force structure largely designed for a different mission. The
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orientation of the Union Navy at the start of the Civil War was predicated upon
28
harassing operations at sea against a superior foe, presumably Great Britain.
It was incumbent upon the Union naval commanders of the Civil War to grow
a new force. Similarly, as we enter the post-industrial era, we also have a force
that is not entirely appropriate for the strategic situation we face. While we are
in a position to downsize, we are challenged to deal with presumptive sea
control using a force structured to do something else.
The second parallel to the Civil War concerns our need to project power over
vast distances into areas where we do not have bases.
A third parallel concerns major technological change. The Confederates
attempted to challenge the presumptive Union sea control with torpedoes
(mines), ironclads, and improved shore-to-ship gunnery. The Union responded
with technological innovations of its own. By war's end, the United States had
a naval force well suited for littoral warfare on a grand scale, a navy which,
once the Confederacy had been destroyed, it quickly scrapped in favor of one
29
more suited to traditional U.S. naval missions.
The main difference between our situation and that faced by the Union is
that the Union was confronted by a coherent threat to its survival. Although any
threat to us is incoherent in the extreme, the two situations have an overarching
parallel in that each, in its own way, represents a key turning point in the way
U.S. naval forces do business.
The Union's leaders responded to the challenges of the Civil War with
innovations in strategy, tactics, and interservice cooperation, many of which
were born of desperation. Cooperation with the Army was probably better in
that conflict than it was prior to the war, and it was not nearly as good again
until World War II. The navy accepted two key missions. The first was purely
strategic, in the form of a naval blockade that eventually played a key supporting
role in breaking the South's will to fight. The second was power projection.
The blockade became increasingly effective and was a major factor in the
South's eventual collapse. It was made possible by presumptive Union sea
control, a presumption that was never seriously challenged during the course
of the war. To be sure, Southern raiders such as the CSS Alabama were an
expensive annoyance, but Navy Secretary Gideon Welles wisely kept the focus
of effort on the blockade despite strong pressure by Northern commercial
interests to do otherwise. This presumptive sea control would have been
overturned by British entry into the war; fortunately (since it might well have
been decisive in the favor of the Confederacy), that did not come to pass.

The Confederacy made several attempts to challenge the blockade with ironclad
technology; the most notable of these was highlighted by the Monitor-Merrimac
confrontation. Such clashes made headlines when they occurred, but the U.S.
17
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public and Congress generally presumed Northern sea superiority. Similar
conditions prevailed in the Korean War, the Vietnam War, and in the recent
Gulf war. In those instances, sea control would never have been truly ap
preciated unless it had been lost.
Most of the Civil War naval battles took place when the Union attempted to
project power against the shore. In this regard, that war was perhaps more like
World War n in the Pacific than it was to Korea, Vietnam, or the recent war in
the Gulf. Sea power had to be applied against the shore in areas far removed
from the bases the United States had. The primary difference between the
Pacific War, the Civil War, and our situation today is that in the Pacific War
there was a powerful opposing fleet. Necessarily, all other naval force structure
was secondary to that needed to win sea control. For the most part, this force
structuring formula was applied during the Cold War due to the sea denial threat
posed by the Soviet Navy. The limited wars previously mentioned, which were
fought under the Cold War umbrella (Desert Storm included), were lesser
included cases that were fought using the active sea control force structure.
The primary strategic thrust of Union planning was to develop a two-phased
approach to power projection campaigns. The first phase was to seize an
advanced base deep in Confederate territory. In some cases, such as at New
Orleans, Union forces "kicked down the door" in order to create their advanced
bases. On the Peninsula, the Union Navy landed General George B.
McClellan's army where the enemy was not, and it built up a logistics base from
scratch in a manner similar to the current Navy-Marine Corps "over-the
horizon" concept.
Unfortunately for McClellan, he found that getting ashore is only half of the
equation; once ashore, the ultimate objective must still be obtained. Former
Secretary of the Navy James Webb pointed this out forcefully to naval planners
during his tenure, and the observation remains valid today. The key point here
is that Union naval supremacy made it possible for the Union army to begin
operations far from its own bases.
One of the most striking aspects of the rapidly evolving Union strategy
during the Civil War was the way in which it forced jointness upon often
unwilling participants. Some combinations of commanders did it better than
others. GeneralUlysses S. Grant and Admiral David D. Porter eventually found
30

the proper joint mix, but it was not done without a number of false starts.

In

the absence of a developed amphibious doctrine, and lacking the robust Marine
Corps amphibious capability developed in the twentieth century, Army and
Navy planners improvised as best they could. The end result was not pretty, but
it generally got the job done.
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The LiUoral Battle Space Control Area

(LBCA).

During an era of single

superpower naval superiority, as in the Civil War, the door through which we
choose to project sea power ashore and transfonn it into effective actions on
land is the point at which most naval battles will occur. This area includes the
point at which we choose to place forces ashore, and the area needed to build
these forces into a true joint warfighting capability, as well as the sea, air, and
space areas adjacent to this landward requirement. If this description sounds
similar to that of the traditional amphibious objective area (AOA), the similarity
is deliberate; it is the essence of the shift from a blue-water to a littoral naval
strategic focus.
One tenn that might be applied to this expanded area is the "battle space. "

In order t o stress the sea-air-shore aspect of the problem, i t i s preferable to refer
to it as the littoral battle space control area (LBCA). This area can be envisioned
as being far larger than the traditional AOA, for it must accommodate all the
operations of a naval expeditionary force, including its aircraft carriers.
The LBCA is envisioned as the naval component commander's zone of action
within the overall battle space controlled by the CinC, sub-unified commander,
or joint task force commander. If naval forces are first on the scene, the LBCA
might well include the CinC 's entire battle space. As other forces enter the
theater through the bridge and door provided by naval forces, the LBCA would
shrink to a size adequate to accommodate the seaward (predominately Navy)
and landward (predominately Marine Corps) operations of the naval forces.
The Naval Expeditionary Force. The commander of the regionally oriented
naval expeditionary force command element, which was designed to manage
forward presence in chapter 1, would become the naval operational commander
in a major regional contingency. The NEF, as originally envisioned by the
NFCPE, is outlined in figure 6. As ajoint Navy-Marine Corps staff, this element
would coordinate the overall naval warfighting effort in the theater. The NEF
commander would be an officer of either the Marine Corps or Navy, as
appropriate, and he would command and control all the aspects of the landward
and seaward sectors of the LBCA. This would avoid the confusing and poten
tially disastrous command relationships of Operations Desert Shield and Desert
Stonn, as shown in figure 7. It would replace them with a cleaner configuration,
as shown in figure 8, with the NEF commander in charge of all operational
warfighting naval forces. CA TF/CLF planning relationships remain, using new
names, but this new relationship is more easily translated into joint tenns. The
littoral battles pace control area is the naval component commander's AOR. This
relationship is much more easily understood than the AOA. It also eliminates
the argument over service versus functional componency. In either situation,
the Naval Component Commander (NCC)owns all naval forces .
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FIgure 6

Figure 7 is a rough approximation of the naval command relationships in the
CentCom area of responsibility during the Gulf war. The landward area of what
could be called the littoral zone belonged to the commanding general of I MEF,
the warfighting operational Marine commander, who was also dual-hatted as
the Marine component commander. Commmander, Seventh Fleet, was the
Navy component commander as well as the Navy warfighting commander. He
had two Marine expeditionary brigades and one MEU under his command
afloat. There was no one in charge of the overall littoral effort. The fmal decision
not to conduct an amphibious landing was made at a conference involving
C o mMarCent, ComNavCent , and CinCCentCom ( G eneral Norman
Schwartzkopt).
The command relationship in figure 8 has the NEF commander in charge of
all naval forces in the LBCA. His Marine Corps subordinate (land maneuver

element commander) commands forces ashore, while his Navy subordinate (sea
maneuver element commander) commands those afloat. A supporting element
renders logistical (less combat service) support to both. A naval component
commander would remain with the CinC to ass ist in political-military and
strategic planning. He would be the senior naval officer in theater; as such he
would be responsible for joint strategic naval planning as well as strategic
logistics. The command relationship is shown in figure 9.
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Figure 7

The Naval Component Commander. One of the primary criticisms of the naval
conduct of Operation Desert Storm was of the lack of a strategic naval
representative in the CinC 's headquarters at RiyadhY The warfighting tacti
caJjoperational commanders of both the Navy and Marine components were
dual-hatted as component commanders. This arrangement was both difficult
and confusing. At the same time, the commanders of the Navy 's Pacific Fleet
and the Marine Corps' Fleet Marine Corps Pacific were relegated to the status
of providers of forces and monitors of the situation; this was a far cry from their
active operationaJjstrategic roles in World War II. This situation repeated itself
in Operations Sea Angel and Fiery Vigil, the humanitarian relief operations in
Bangladesh and the Philippines respectively. The Marine Corps has reacted to
this situation by designating the commanding general of the Fleet Marine Force
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NEF Command of All Naval Forces in LBCA
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Figure 8

Pacific as the Marine component commander for the Pacific Command
3
(paCom) and Central Command (CentCom) contingencies. 2 The Navy has
designated a separate Navy component commander for CentCom. CinCPac
Fleet remains the Navy component commander for PaCom. A single designated
naval component headquarters is needed to handle naval componency issues.
Separate component and operational commanders are not needed in all cases.

Lesser regional contingencies such as NEOs and humanitarian operations may
not require such arrangements. The naval component commander would free
the

NEF commander from the burden of regional strategic planning

and allow

him to concentrate on operational matters.
It would be best if the Navy and Marine Corps were to combine the staff of
the two fleet CinCs with those of the two Fleet Marine Force headquarters into
two super-CinCs (CinC Naval Forces Atlantic and CinC Naval Forces Pacific)
in order to create a joint naval headquarters. This headquarters would provide
forces to the unified CinCs on a day-to-day basis as well as develop a series of
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deployable Navy-Marine Corps naval component command battle staffs to
handle the forward supporting plans as well as naval component issues in a
theater during contingencies. Navy and Marine Corps flag officers would rotate
in command; the notion that one has to be a qualified ship ' s commanding officer
or a regimental commander to do strategic or operational planning at the joint
level in our new littoral naval environment is no longer supportable. As the NEF
commander assumes the function of the naval operational commander, the
naval component commander becomes the chief naval strategist in the theater.

An NEF commander fights at the operational level of war. The ability to plan
and operate in a joint and combined environment will take precedence over
ship-handling or MEF tactical skills.
Naval Aviation Integration. The integration of naval (Navy and Marine Corps)
fixed-wing aviation arose late in 1 99 1 as a result of the desire on the part of the
OpNav staff to ensure that enough aircraft were available to provide a full air
33
wing to each of the carriers envisioned in the base force.
This was to be
accomplished by assigning some Marine Corps squadrons aboard carriers. This
has been done before and some Marines see it as a way to ensure that Marine
aviation support to troops ashore comes early in a littoral amphibious campaign.
There are serious issues, however, that need to be resolved before integration
is implemented.
The first issue involves the command philosophy of the carrier air wing and
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its staffmg. Many Marines, and not a few sailors, point out that there must be
a quid pro quo; in a littoral environment they feel that ass igning Marine
squadrons to carrier air wings

(CVWs)

commanded exclusively by Navy

officers is both unfair and unwise. If the emphasis is littoral , Marines are going
to need to learn to do carrier operations better, and Navy pilots must get better
at air-to-mud work. A truly integrated command and staff arrangement is
appropriate. These Marines argue that the composition of the

CVW staff should

be Navy-Marine and that command should rotate on a "blue-green" basis. This
author agrees.
If we are to develop a truly better naval support of ground forces and a more
joint orientation in general, Marine Corps command and staff expertise is
essential to the CVW's ability to plan and execute this improved support. Marine
aviators are trained to understand ground tactics and combined arms warfare;
the more senior officers will have attended other service schools as well. In
addition, many Marine aviators have served exchange tours with ground units.
They will be excellent fac ilitators for "purpling" the

CVW. In this manner, the

true "naval air wing" can be formed for effective carrier air support of littoral
operations. By the same reasoning, Navy aviators should be given some of the
same cross-training opportunities as Marines.
A second major issue that must be addressed before real naval aviation
integration can be realized is the need for naval aviation to go ashore in an
expeditionary environment; as the littoral battle moves inland, this wi ll be an
ongoing requirement. If the CVW needs to be backfilled to replace aviation units
that have gone ashore, procedures must be devised to accommodate that. We
need also to address the matter of "yellow gear," the equipment at air bases and
in carriers needed to support an aviation unit ashore. Marine ground support
equipment is expeditionary, while comparable Navy equipment general ly is
not. If that fact were to be allowed to govern action, it would lead to the carrier's
Marine Corps squadrons being dispatched when aviation is to be based ashore,
while the Navy squadrons stayed afloat. But aviation ground support equipment
aboard the MPF ships and T-AK aviation support ships can support the Navy 's
squadrons ashore. Navy squadrons from carriers not deployed to the crisis area
would then backfill the carrier. In Desert Storm, six carriers were deployed.
This means that if the base force figure of twelve carriers holds true for forward
presence rotation, and six remains an adequate figure for crisis response, there
wil l be six carriers capable of backfilling the Marine aircraft sent ashore. Such
an arrangement is acceptable for short regional contingencies. A large threat
would require reconstitution as outlined in chapter IV.
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Naval Deep Strike Capability. In this era of littoral warfare, how much deep
strike capability does the United States Navy need? This is an area in which we
have not yet reached a consensus. Many people believe that the maximum limit
is 500 nautical miles; others hold that 1 80 is sufficient. The strike radius from
carrier-based aircraft should extend to the farthest landward boundary of the

LBCA. If the LBCA is to be extended beyond an agreed-upon range limit for
carrier-based aircraft, landward bases must then be procured inside the LBCA

to do so. TLAMs or Air Force aircraft should be used for special strikes beyond
naval aircraft range. The concept here is that the range should fit the battle space
of the force. This requires study by a joint air-ground group in order to determine
how deep "deep enough" really is.
The other key question for fixed-wing aviation is "How much technology is
enough?" Do we need stealth now that the Soviets are no longer around to
upgrade air defense technology significantly? Perhaps we would be better off
to skip production generations of technology if there is no threat on the horizon
to challenge significantly what we have now. The current proposal to use F- 1 4
airframes to replace the aging A-6 appears to be a reasonable fi x until w e see
a threat on the horizon that will warrant development of a follow-on. This issue
is dependent on our being able to give the F- 1 4 an all-weather attack capability.
Perhaps now is the time to propose interest-bearing "seed bank" accounts to
Congress, al lowing the services to store money saved by skipping generations
of new aircraft and then permitting them to buy a truly revolutionary system in
sufficient numbers when it is really needed.

Joint Forces Air Component Command (JFACC). The IFACC was one of the
most difficult issues to emerge from Operation Desert Storm after-action
review. The Defense Department after-action report on the war in the Gulf
called for more interoperability between the Navy and other U. S. armed service
components and for attempts to centralize coordination of aviation efforts
34
The degree to which centralization is needed varies from
between them.
contingency to contingency; Operation Sea Angel, the humanitarian ass istance
operation in Bangladesh, did not need nearly the degree of centralization
required of Operation Desert Storm. However, when complicated centralization
is needed, the requirement is immensely difficult; Lieutenant General H.C.
Stackpole ITI pointed out recently that the Navy does not have the capability to
run a Desert Storm-type IFACC at sea without taking a major Navy platform
3S
This is a grave deficiency for our

(i.e., CV or LCe) out of combatant status.

naval forces if we are to use them as command posts for joint operations.
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Emerging Nal1al Litto ral Warfare Doctrine.

How would a naval littoral

campaign work as an enabling bridge for a joint operation? What follows is a
view of how naval doctrine for such operations should emerge.

Phase I. Achieving Superiority in the Littoral Battle Space Control
Area. The

LBCA can be defined as the

land, sea, air, and space area requiring

our control in order to ensure that an enemy cannot foil any proposed naval
operation of ours. The square (or cubic) mileage will vary depending chiefly
on the size, technological sophistication, and military capability of our op
ponent.
If we contemplate only an MPF offload to reinforce a threatened ally , the job
will be easy initially; it would probably entail bringing in sufficient naval forces
to protect the offload. If the enemy chooses not to interfere, the operation might

well end at Phase I. If Operation Desert Shield had caused Saddam Husse i n to
abandon Kuwait in the fall of 1990, the situation would have been roughly
analogous to the successful Phase I stand-alone effort. However, the joint
enabling role played by naval forces in the events leading up to the g reat
offensive of Desert Storm is probably a more predictive model for a Phase I
operation in a major regional contingency. Naval forces provided the early air
power, credible land power, and joint sustainment for the early phases of the
crisis. During the buildup phase, sealift provided the vast majority of sustain
ment.
If entry into the theater needs to be forcible, Phase I becomes the precursor
to a standard amphibious operation. Control of the

LBCA

may well require a

substantial air-sea-space battle. The use of the word space here is not used in
an attempt to appear overly visionary. We need control of space to ensure that
such seemingly simple factors as unhindered use of our satcom links remain
presumptive; we would not assume that a future opponent will be as accom
modating as Saddam Hussein in that regard. (National assets can provide space
control, but such control must be a valid assumption in establishing
control.) If an amphibious operation is needed, the

LBCA

LBCA

will need to include

a number of enemy port and airfield complexes within its boundaries as
potential objectives to keep the opposition uncertain of the actual objective. If
we are to utilize truly the spirit of maneuver warfare, we will also keep the
actual objective flexible as well. Figure 10 outlines the concept.
The most fundamental change in naval warfare occurs in phase I. Control of
the

LBCA

will not be a lesser included naval requirement in the future; it will

be the primary rationale for naval force structure. Sailors and Marines who
cannot accept that development will not be competitive in a rapidly changing
joint warfighting environment.
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LBCA

consists of the sea, air, lan d , and space area req uired to ensure that naval operations

can be conducted without enemy interference. If an amphibious operation is involved, the

LBCA should

include at least two, and preferably more, port/airfield complexes in order to confuse the enemy as to
the ulti mate objective.
J.R. Nunes. Jr.

Source:

Redrawn from Marini! Corps Gauni!, vol . 76, no. 6, June 1 992, p.40.
Figure 10

Phase II. Probing for the Seams. If presumptive blue-water sea control is
the major strategic change of the new world order, the LCAC-LAV-helicopter
(LLH) team may well be the great operational breakthrough. As used here, the
tenn "helicopter" includes the medium lift requirement (such as the V -22) as
well as existing helicopters. In the past, not only were our choices of places to
land restricted, but once our forces had been deposited ashore, they were
committed to their beachhead both physically and psychologically. We could
try to land where the enemy was not, but we were committed even if we guessed
wrong. The LLH team has changed all of that. Now, we can launch multiple
probes toward a series of widely separated objectives. We can then choose from
among them the landing sites we want. If a landing site proves to be unproductive,
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The probing stage is characterized by the use of a number of probes by LCACs carrying LAVs and
supported by helicopters to ensure that beaches and landing zones are reasonably clear of opposition.
If that is not the case, these reconnaissance assets can be quickly withdrawn. In this way, the best focus
of effort can be determined.
J.R Nunes, Jr.

Source:

Redrawn from Marine Corps Gazene, vol. 76, no. 6, June 1992, p. 40.

Figure 11

we can disengage much more readily than we were able to do in the past. Figure

1 1 illustrates this concept.
Moderately productive sites can be used for deception, for supporting
attacks, and as candidates to shift the focus of effort to as the situation dictates.
This allows us to keep the enemy off balance, unsure of our actual objective,
and reacting to our previous move as we begin the next. The LLH team becomes
the moral equivalent of the swift German reconnaissance forces that made the
blitzkrieg concept so successful by fmding and exploiting seams in enemy
defenses in order to allow other forces to flow through in what Liddel Hart
called a "raging torrent."

Pbase ill. Seizing tbe Lodgement. Once a fmal airport/seaport lodgement
has been selected and a focus of effort determined, it can be seized from a
direction that wi1l most disrupt our opponent, as outlined in figure 12. This
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Seizing the Airport/Seaport Lodgement

o

I

25

I

50

I

Miles

Having secured a temporary lodgement, the landing force builds up combat power

and

strike toward

the main objective from unanticipated directions.
J.A N.... . Jr.

Source: Redrawn from Marine Corps Gal.ene, vol. 76, no. 6, June 1992, p. 4 1 .

Figure 1 2

fast-moving, hard-hitting attack will be facilitated by air-delivered precision
guided munitions (PGMs), Tomahawk-type missiles (TLAMs), and deep strikes
by Air Force stealth aircraft against targets which, though outside the LBCA,
might interfere with our operation by means of long-range capabilities or
fast-moving reserve forces. Better maps than we now have are necessary to
accomplish all of this.
Phase IV. The Joint Raging Torrent. Once we are established ashore, we
can introduce war-winning joint forces into theater. This means that naval
forces will allow the introduction of Army and Air Force packages capable of
providing the hammer to end the conflict on terms favorable to the United States
and its allies, as was done in Operation Desert Storm where the MPF capability
was a major joint enabler in the early Desert Shield phase. Early response is a
naval forte, as is continued seaborne sustainment.
29
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We must make this transition more seamlessly connected than it was in
Desert Storm. This sequencing of joint forces into the theater should be done
in a mann er that does not allow the opponent opportunity to organize his forces
or plans. He must be kept "sightless" and continually reacting to our previous
move as we proceed with our next. Figure 1 3 illustrates this concept. We fully
expect that naval forces will contribute to the war-winning hammer, but we
expect this phase to be one where AirfLand Doctrine takes the lead.
Sequencing of Joint Forces into Theater

Heavy Reinforcement
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Once the fi nal lodgment is secure, the joint torrent operation is launched to move to conflict
termination with terms favorable to the U nited States and its allies. This sequencing must be 'seam
less' and relatively rapid ; in other words, more rapid than that of enemy's capability to react.

J.A. Nunes. Jr

SOUTce:

Redrawn from Marine Corps Gazette, vol.

76, no. 6, June 1992,

FIgu re

13

p.

41.

Phase V. Turning Out the Lights and Closing the Door. As in the Gulf
war, we can expect naval forces to be the first to go in and the last to leave. The
integrity of the LBCA must be maintained until it is no longer required. When
everyone else has gone home, the Navy-Marine Corps team must continue to
30
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provide the forward presence that will reinforce the lessons of the 1990-1991
36
Gulf crisis and minimize the chance of a reccurrence.
So What Is Really New ? For the most part, things will not really change that
much for Marines. The Marine Corps was well on its way toward an over-the
horizon doctrine in coordination with our amphibious brethren in the Navy long
before the momentous events of 1989-1991. The real change will be in naval
force structure and doctrine. By switching our focus from blue water to the
littorals, Navy officers will need to commit themselves to new challenges such
as mine countermeasures, shallow-water anti-submarine operations, and the
integration of joint air operations in the maritime environment. Our next
Nimitzes and Halseys may well look more like Farraguts and Porters. We may
truly find the future in the past.
Recommendations. There will be those in the Navy and Marine Corps who
view the following recommendations as heretical. Some of the recommenda
tions result from issues proposed by the Naval Force Capabilities Planning
Effort that resulted in " . . . From the Sea"; others are those proposed but
considered to be too radical for inclusion in that document's recommendations;
and others are the author's own.
Doctrine. The naval services should develop a joint Navy/Marine Corps
37
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doctrine center with rotating command to build littoral doctrine.

Corps currently has a doctrine center, and the Navy is developing one under the
cognizance of CinCLantFleet in Norfolk. However, that is merely a beginning.
Separate, independent, Navy-Marine entities will not do the job. We must "bite
the bullet" and become naval in the Navy-Marine sense of the word if we are
ever to become truly joint. Moves in this direction are occurring as this is being
written.
Naval Expeditionary Force

(NEF)

Capability. The NEF should become

the primary naval operational warfighter in major regional contingencies.
Develop a True Naval Component for the Unified CinCs. Combine the
existing Navy and Marine component staffs in the Atlantic and Pacific into
Naval Forces Lant and Pac. Structure the staffs as joint Navy-Marine organiza
tions and rotate command between Navy and Marine flag officers.
Mine C ountermeasures (MCM). First, the Navy must develop a truly
mobile and capable MCM capability. That means being able to get the assets to
where they are needed in a timely manner. This is an area where capabilities
may be centrally pooled for dispatch to a crisis area as needed. Although the

LLH team affords a better capability than traditional landing craft for avoiding
mined areas in amphibious operations, we cannot rationalize away the requirement
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to clear mines effectively from key areas such as ports and choke points when
the occasion demands it. We will need to use the ports eventually. It may well

be necessary to explore better ways of integrating Coast Guard capabilities into
this effort under overall naval cognizance.
Shallow-Water Antisubmarine Warfare. Sometimes it will be essential to

be able to destroy enemy submarines in shallow water. Perhaps it will be
possible to use emerging technologies to conduct these operations. Like the
minesweeping capability, these assets need not be forward deployed on a
constant basis; however, they do need to be rapidly deployable. This area ranks
with MCM as a high priority challenge.
Improved Defense against Anti-Ship Missiles. The point defense aspects
of littoral warfare demand constant improvement in this area.
Joint Forces Air Component Command

(JFACC)

at Sea. Naval forces

must be able to do this without taking a platform out of combatant status. We
currently do not have

CVs or LCes to spare.

It may be that this capability can

be pooled for dispatch to the crisis area as needed.
Protection of Satcom Capabilities. This may not be entirely a naval
responsibility, but our naval forces should participate fully in the mechanisms
being developed to ensure the integrity of our entire command and control
infrastructure in any theater.
Improved Sea-Based Logistics Capability. Strong emphasis should be
placed on sea-based logistics and strong host nation support agreements that
are well insulated from political-military disruption by potential theater adver
saries. However, the long-term goal of naval contingencies should be to carry
and store all logistics afloat, transferring items and materiel to other ships and
commands ashore as needed.

32

Nuclear Deterrence and Recovery
What Has Not Changed. With the collapse of the Soviet Union and much that
followed, a thennonuclear exchange between the United States and Russ i a is
more unlikely than ever. Still, the Russian Federation remains the only nation
on earth capable of destroying the United States. Consequently, the United
States retains a "strategic" nuclear deterrent of which the ballistic missile
submarines of the United States Navy are the most survivable portion. They
can expect to remain so until developments render them unnecessary. The last
such development may be a long time in coming.
What Has Changed. As the threat of a superpower nuclear exchange has sunk,
the threat of regional nuclear proliferation and use has risen. Because the United
States does not yet have a finnly stated policy on these issues, it is difficult to
predict the Navy ' s future role in this field. Indeed, the line between "strategic"
nuclear deterrence and regional conventional deterrence is fuzzy. Some U. S .
experts argue strongly for an across-the-board policy o f n o proliferation and
massive retaliation for any first use anywhere, even if this means unilateral
action by the United States in situations where vital U . S . interests are not
threatened. This is intended to send a strong message against nuclear prolifera
tion. Not everyone shares this view.
It is clear that there has been proliferation on the part of lesser powers. Four
of the fonner Soviet republics have nuclear weapons. Despite promises and
strong international pressures to move those weapons to Russi a, as of this
writing, Belarus, Kazakhstan, and the Ukraine have not done so. There have
even been press reports that Kazakhstan has sold a nuclear weapon to Iran. In
addition, Pakistan appears to have a nuclear capability to rival that of India.
These alanning developments make urgent the rapid development of anti
proliferation regimes, but there is no consensus as to the fonn that those regimes
should take.
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Weapons Security and Accountability. This is a major problem in the
former Soviet republics. Although there is reasonable assurance that "strategic"
weapons are accounted for, there is no similar assurance of an accurate count
of "tactical" nuclear weapons. U. S . naval forces may well be called upon to
provide expertise in this area, to participate in international teams of inspection,
or to contribute consultants in support of future arms control agreements. Some
believe that the likelihood of a nuclear accident in both the former Soviet Union
and the Third World is increasing . Should one occur, U.S. naval forces,
particularly the ARG/MEU(SOC)s and the MPF capability in some form may be
called upon to conduct humanitarian ass istance, disaster, relief, or radiologist
decontamination operations. This has implications for both logistics and train
ing. Similar accidents with chemical weapons may also lead to a call for help. 3 8
Furthermore, there is a very real possibility of nuclear use or accident in our
future.
Proliferation Easier to Deal with Than Post-Proliferation. Proliferation
is the acquisition of nuclear weapons by a state or other actor previously without
them. Post-proliferation problems that treat the threatened use of nuclear
weapons or decisions about what to do with them are even more difficult than
managing the proliferation stage itself. Once a weapon is produced, it is difficult
to find and deal with, whereas production means and suppliers are easier to cope
with when proliferation is occurring; this does not mean that this is an easy
process, as demonstrated by U. S . and UN experience in Iraq and Korea. The
Israeli air strike on an Iraqi nuclear reactor in 198 1 exemplifies a successful
action during the proliferation stage. The discussion concerning the difficulty
of confirming the existence of a Kazakhstan-supplied Iranian bomb, as well as
the debate about what to do about it, outlines the problems of post-proliferation.
One thing seems certain, naval forces are likely to be the military response of
first consideration in a proliferation or post-proliferation crisis. An MEU(SOC)
raid, TLAM strike, or naval air strike are the most likely on-scene options for
immediate use. Other naval options range from support of human intelligence
and reconnaissance to the use of aircraft carrier battle groups and amphibious
forces as a show of force or strike force, if required. 39
The Problems of Preemption. It is difficult to determine how best to
preempt the firing of a nuclear weapon by a Third World power, even if a
ready-to-shoot weapon were found. Moreover, not many people, either before
or after the event, are likely to be enthusiastic about conducting a preemptive
nuclear attack to dissuade the firing of such a weapon by a Third World actor.
The naval instruments of preemption would be the same as those we use today
for dealing with crises and providing forward presence and strategic deterrence.
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Naturally, one turns to the thought of mounting an overwhelming conven
tional assault on such an actor, but one must question whether such an assault
would prevent or would encourage the weapon 's possessor to fIre it. It is clear
that our human intelligence in such situations must get much better. So must
our knowledge of how naval forces can support human intelligence activities.
Retaliation. The threat of retaliation to punish the perpetrator of a nuclear
attack and to deter further conduct of this nature is also a matter for concern.
But again, it is unclear whether retaliation should be nuclear, conventional, or
should be contemplated at all. Normal naval forces would have a key role in
supporting either conventional or nuclear retaliation. The primary challenge in
an era of reduced U . S . force structure would be to ensure that the forces retain
the capability to conduct such operations.
The United Nations and other Collective Regimes. After a long period of
indifference, this subject has regained life. The need for some degree of
long-range seaborne logistical support, particularly from Military Sealift Com
mand (MSC) vessels, seems to characterize most of the new thought on this
subject. None, however, require forces or techniques not already in the inven
tory.
Observations. The evolving nature of nuclear deterrence may make the very
idea of "strategic deterrence" obsolete, replacing it with a concept that runs the
gamut from deterring Russian nuclear use to supporting international anns
control regimes. To do any such thing at all, will, of course, require policy
decisions; however, naval leaders will be required to monitor developments
closely, because the forces they command will be required to play a significant
role in virtually every policy enforcement action that can reasonably be con
templated.
Recommendations. The area of standard nuclear strategic deterrence is one
where the new world order may actually be less complicated than the old. Naval
forces will simply be doing the same thing in the future that they have in the
past, but they will be doing less of it. However, an entirely new set of policy
and strategy imperatives may arise in response to Third World nuclear prolifera
tion. Most of these will not require radically new naval capabilities. However,
the following recommendations are in order.
Support for Human Intelligence Collection and Reconnaiss ance. In this
area, forward deployed naval forces must strive constantly for improvement.
Target information will be the absolute first priority in both proliferation and
post-proliferation operations. We must improve naval capabilities in both joint
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operations and operations in conjunction with national intelligence assets . This
includes naval support of special operations forces.

Radiological and Nuclear Weapons Expertise.

We must work on our

ability to do radiological decontamination on short notice to ensure that it does

not atrophy. This includes our ability to do so in both combat and humanitarian

situations. As part of our preemption capability, as well as to contribute to

nuclear safety operations, we must be able to rapidly deploy teams capable of
disarming or disabling nuclear devices. These teams need not necessari ly be
made up of naval personnel, but they will have to fit in with MEU(SOC) or SEAL
methods of entry and withdrawal. In this regard, we should explore the pos
sibilities of virtual reality technology as a way of providing technical expertise
4O
to remote locations without the physical presence of the technician.

Global Protection against Limited Strikes (GPALS). The shipboard com
patibility of anti-ballistic missile systems should also continue to be a priority
subject of study. We cannot count on land-based Patriot systems in all situa
tions.

Humanitarian Capabilities in Nuclear Disasters. The ability of U.S. naval
forces to react to a nuclear disaster in a timely and effective manner should be
reviewed. This is particularly true in the case of reconfiguring the modules
being developed for MPF ships for low-intensity conflict or humanitarian
assistance operations. Although not truly a deterrent, this capability may well
be the military option most likely to be used, given the notoriously low safety

standards for nuclear facilities in places such as the former Soviet Union.
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IV
Reconstitution
This Is Not the End of History. The events of 1989- 199 1, which signalled the
end of the Soviet Union, the Warsaw Pact, and a superpower naval threat to the
United States and it allies, should not be viewed as an end to history . At some
point-perhaps in the distant future, perhaps not-the United States may again
face another superpower competitor with aspirations and agendas which the
41
United States will view as hostile to its own. We cannot tell whether such a
threat will resemble that of the former Soviet Union or stem from a combination
of power and an ideology or economic philosophy so alien to our own that we
will consider our vital interests to be threatened.
When the original draft of the current National Military Strategy appeared
in the summer of 199 1, the section on reconstitution postulated a renewed
42
hostility on the part of an intact Soviet Union.
Estimates at the time on the
Soviet ability to reconstitute into a credible threat ranged from eighteen to
thirty-six months. That draft was prepared before the breakup of the Union into
fifteen fractious and independent republics. That breakup slowed the former
Soviet Union's ability to reconstitute so much that a decade might be needed
to reach the old threat level. It was agreed that this time frame would hold true
generally for other "potential" superpowers developing a military capability to
challenge the United States on a global basis. This means that for a decade
indications and warning of trouble on the horizon likely will be highly visible.
In any case, the Soviet Union no longer exists. As a result, some observers
ask whether reconsitution should remain a critical leg of the National Military
Strategy. It remains the strategy 's most difficult and potentially the most
contentious aspect. Because so little written work has been done on this
forgotten leg of the National Military Strategy, many of the proposals are the
author's own, derived from his participation in war games, seminars, and
discussions on the subject with DoD and service officials.
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Part of the problem lies in grasping the meaning of the concept. The National
Military Strategy dermes reconstitution as follows: "As we reduce the size of
our military forces in response to the demise of the global threat, we must
preserve a credible capability to forestall any potential adversary from compet
ing militarily with the United States. This 'reconstitution' is intended to deter
such a power from militarizing and, if deterrence fails, to provide a global
warfighting capability. Reconstitution involves fielding, forming, and training
new fighting units [emphasis added] . This includes initially drawing on cadre
type units and laid up military assets, particularly shipping; mobilizing pre
viously trained or new manpower; and activating the industrial base on a large
scale so as to equip these new forces. Reconstitution also involves maintaining
technology, doctrine, training, experienced military personnel, and the innova
tion necessary to retain the competitive edge in decisive areas of potential
military competition. "43
The definition listed above has several potential, if inadvertent, red herrings.
First, in the context of reconstitution, "mobilization" is not generally meant to
be a call-up of forces but a call-up of assets that have been released to
non-military purposes in the wake of the Cold War. Second, reconstitution is
not meant as a threat to economic development on the part of present (potential
superpower) friends and allies; it is contemplated as a deterrent to the develop
44
ment of a superpower military capability by a potential foe.
The

Nal1al Dimension.

The deterrent factor inherent in reconstitution is par

ticularly relevant here. One of the key causes of the economic collapse of the
Soviet Union was its attempt to keep up with the United States as an economic

and a military superpower. The enormous capital investment in Admiral Sergei
Gorshkov's "blue water" navy may well have been the proverbial straw that
broke the camel 's back for the Soviets. That cost will be an enormous considera
tion for a potential foe considering its transformation into a military super
power; therein lies the deterrent value for the United States of possessing a
reconstitution capability. However, that reconstitution capability must be
credible; to be credible, it must be affordable. A potential foe must know that
we can beat a potential superpower threat without doing to ourselves what the
Soviets did to themselves.
The cost of reconstitution is a major problem, especially for the Navy, which
needs expensive ships, aircraft, sensors, and weapons. Not only must we
accustom ourselves to making do longer with old models, but also we must
make do with fewer than before. Because of our declining domestic industrial
base, we must avoid scrapping old ships and replacing them with new ones. To
fail in this regard could price us out of reconstitution altogether. In itself,
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reconstitution is a fragile concept because it entails the kind of long-range
strategic thinking that is not often practiced in the United States. Congress and
the public are probably willing to spend pennies for an ounce of prevention, but
they are unlikely to invest in thinly disguised subsidies for the ailing U. S .
shipbuilding industry.
What is needed then is a reconstitution philosophy that reflects the fact that
this leg of the National Military Strategy is a hedge against a future anns race.

As the largesse of the Reagan defense buildup fades ever further into the past,
the manner in which we reduce our power will entail making very soon some
profound decisions about reconstitution which, if they prove mistaken, will not
be reversible.
Assumptions. There are several key assumptions implicit in this discussion.
First, any threat or combination of threats that arise will do so with ap
proximately a decade ' s worth of indications and warning.
Second, over the next few decades the basic ship propulsion units and hull
types presently in use will remain operable and no radical technology will
45
render them obsolete. We must assume further that any radical development
in these technologies by a potentially hostile power would initiate a correspond
ing development by the United States, and that accordingly, in the absence of
such a threat, the United States would not invest in such development.
Third, most new weapons technologies can be modularized in such a way as
to be attached to existing hulls rather than requiring "keel-up" development.
46
This is not always a popular assumption, but it is technically feasible.
Fourth and finally, nuclear submarines can indeed be mothballed for later
47
The notion that we cannot do so is being discredited

use should the need arise.

rapidly. A senior naval officer admonished his peers to this effect at a recent
war game.
Crafting a Naval Reconstitution Strategy. A naval reconstitution strategy
should have four legs: science and technology, production planning, personnel
planning, and strategic and doctrinal thought. Each leg should be designed
carefully and incorporated into the build-down before we make decisions from
which we cannot recover.
Science and Technology. We must be careful not to squander our tech
nological superiority. It is perishable. There are ways both to protect our
advanced technology and to share much of it with our allies. If, however, we
should be tempted to spread the fmancial burden of advancing new technologies
by giving some of our ideas to our allies for development, we could mourn that
decision for a long time. Despite current goodwill, today 's allies may well be
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tomorrow's adversaries or neutrals. We would regret it deeply if by our own
hand we had frozen ourselves out of our own technologies.
This is not to advocate producing advanced systems simply because we have
the means to do so. We do need to demonstrate, however, that we can build
advanced systems in such numbers that a potential foe would know he could
not win a new arms race.

Production. The key to the effective use of the production leg of reconstitu

tion to deter a potential competitor from building a threatening military
capability is to show that we can make an arms race prohibitively expensive.
To take a naval example, we must carefully preserve and maintain the ships we
are now taking out of active service. If these ships remain competitive in coming
decades, we will have a commanding lead before we cross the starting line.
A potential competitor will then have to build sufficient ships and weapon
systems to challenge us on a global scale. If we build our naval reconstitution
capability on the premise that 20 1 0 or 2030 we will be able to pull good ships
out of mothballs and place "state-of-the-art" weapons modules on them, we
will have tripled the difficulty for the would-be challenger. To compete with
us, the challenger must first build a naval capability comparable to our un
reconstituted peacetime naval establishment. This would be a daunting and
expensive proposition. It could not be kept secret.
His second challenge would be to overcome our lead in ship construction.
With our ability to bring out old ships with new weapons modules at ap
proximately half the cost of building a completely new ship (this obviously
depends on the absolute cost of technology in the "out years"), the competitor
would have to pay a "buy-in" cost of at least three times our own simply to join
the superpower naval club. In contrast, if we adopt an all-new reconstitution
capability, our opponent will need to invest only enough to match our peacetime
naval capability before he can run with us ship-for-ship in a naval arms race.
This is particularly true for submarines. Truly, in reconstitution, better is the
enemy of good enough. The curve in figure 14 demonstrates that if reconsitution
is properly conceived, the United States can confront, at an affordable cost to
itself, a potential opponent with a crushing economic challenge.
If a technological development comparable to the Civil War ironclad tech
nology-leap arises, rendering current ships obsolete, the arguments above
would become moot, and we would be compelled to invest in new technology.

But that does not render the policy of creative mothballing ineffective as a
prudent hedge against a future naval arms race.
The money saved in buying ships can be used for capitalizing on new weapon
systems, EW suites, and information warfare capabilities. Even in the "worst
case" situation where we would need to build entirely new hulls and propulsion
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Figure 14

systems to counter a radically new emerging technology, the skills needed may
48

be so new that old shipyards would be rendered cost-ineffective anyway.

Some new construction will be needed to maintain required defense skills, but
this author believes we would be prudent to limit this to what is essential.
The only area where the argument cited above may not apply entirely is in
the construction of nuclear submarines; this industry has some very perishable
skills. If some form of subsidy is needed to keep those skills current and present

in the shipyard, we should find a way that is more economical than building
unneeded and unwanted attack submarines. Perhaps a solution would be to keep
one of the submarine yards "warm" by mothballing submarines as they are
decommissioned.
We must also keep open production lines for scarce, slowly produced
munitions to replace those munitions expended in regional contingencies and
also for expansion in case of reconstitution. The answer here may well be to
encourage "skunk works" contractors who will respond to small orders while
keeping key-skills personnel employed as an educational base for expansion.
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People Programs. How do we best sustain the skills needed to conduct
blue-water sea control without bankrupting the personnel accounts of the naval
services? The reserves are an obvious answer. Today we have two essential
types of reservists in the Navy: those who support the active duty establishment
such as the TAR program, and those who support expansion in mobilization
mine warfare is a current capability here. A recent seminar on reserve
capabilities suggested a third category that would embody a reconstitution pool .
A first step in such a progam would be to shift the Navy 's mine warfare
capability from the reserves into regular service and replace it with much of
what is now in the active anti-submarine community. If properly managed, the
reserve surge mobilization capability can be used as a reconstitution cadre.
It is important to remember here the diss imilarity between reconstitution and
mobilization. We mobilize what is currently in the reserves. We reconstitute to
give us a greater mobilization capability. If a P-3 squadron is in reserve status,
it can be mobilized to help in a regional contingency where there is a moderate
submarine threat. With a reasonable investment, that squadron can also be
prepared to act as cadre for reconstitution expansion. By educating the squadron
members to accept positions of responsibility two levels above those that they
are holding, we pave the way for the expanded schools and training squadrons
that would put real teeth into the naval reconstitution capability . This
philosophy was adopted by General Hans von Seeckt when he prepared the
Gennan l 00,OOO -man anny to expand in the years between the world wars,
although our problem is not as severe as that which the Gennans faced. The
successes of the Gennan Anny between 1 939 and 1 942 attest to the efficacy of
49
a "two-up" educational philosophy.
The same could be provided to reserves maintaining laid-up ships. Training
units could concentrate on maintaining the cadre for schools, stressing blue
water sea control skills not needed on a day-to-day active service basis but vital
for reconstitution to deal with an emerging blue-water threat. This would
require frequent exercises with the active forces to keep these skills reasonably
fresh.
The Marine Corps presently maintains a balanced reserve component for
mobilization and would not need to reorganize as thoroughly as the Navy to
transition from a blue-water to a littoral strategy . However, the Marine Corps
Reserve would be an excellent place to create the cadres for expansion during
a time of reconstitution.
The education of mid-level officers in operational and strategic thought
would be an absolute imperative for regulars and reserves alike. Consideration
should be given to a second year "art of naval warfare" course at the Naval War
College, similar to the courses at Leavenworth, Maxwell, and Quantico.
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Doctrine. Blue-water sea control doctrine should not be abandoned but put
on the shelf and refined as new technologies become available. It should also
be exercised and war-gamed, although not nearly as frequently as littoral
operations. The reconstitution cadres should be carefully integrated into such
exercises, and the essentials of blue-water sea control should be taught in
service schools. The naval doctrine center should refine this subject and keep
it current with state-of-the-art technology. However, it should be recognized as
a future case rather than a prerequisite to littoral warfare. Some degree of risk
must be accepted in a time of scarce resources. We will have to accept the fact
that we will not have a top-of-the-line blue-water navy in the absence of a high
seas threat. Our alternative is to become irrelevant to real defense needs.
React Incrementally to I&W if Necessary. The need to reconstitute totally
might not become immediately apparent, and the naval services might need to
react incrementally as bits and pieces of the puzzle become clear. This will be
particularly true if we become aware that another power is pursuing
breakthrough developments in the key elements of naval technologies listed
earlier in this chapter. The naval services may find themselves in the position
of playing "Paul Revere," calling for the implementation of reconstitution.
A Final Observation. In reconstitution, we find one of the purest examples of
the naval forces' capability to act as a political-economic instrument of U.S.
policy. Our obvious readiness to reconstitute could well become our best
insurance of never having to do it.
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Conclusions

T

he United States has entered an era in which this nation is the world 's
only true superpower, in every sense of the word. Although the threat of

global war and that of a nuclear holocaust has lessened, we are still far short of
world peace. There are few nations that have enjoyed our situation, and certainly
there are no exact parallels. The new National Security and Military strategies
are an attempt to deal with the emerging world order in a manner that will
prevent wars, if possible, or win decisively should prevention fail. The new
strategies stress working with and through multinational instruments such as
the United Nations to achieve security and order. The naval policy, strategy,
and doctrinal developments advocated in this study define the naval contribu
tion to the national strategy. They would provide a Navy and Marine Corps
better unified in purpose and function than before. They also would be in
synchronization with the joint approach to military operations that has been
evolving in the wake of the Goldwater-Nichols legislation.
The proposed strategy presented herein is an alternative to that proposed by
Admiral Paul David Miller, who at the time of this writing is CinCLant. Admiral
Miller's concept of adaptive joint force packaging foresees using a naval force
structure that has grown smaller than that which existed in 1989, but one that
has grown smaller in the same Cold War proportions of carriers, submarines,

ASW assets, escorts, MeM, and amphibious shipping. Admiral Miller's
proposal gives the CinCs less than optimal packages.
The naval force structure advocated in this paper would also have fewer
ships, but it would give the CinCs adequate carriers, ARG/MEU packages, and

MPS to accomplish the forward presence missions they deem vital.
The force structure advocated here foresees a navy of about 350-375 ships,
achieved by making do with fewer escorts, submarines, and ASW asse ts. It is a
navy driven by warflghters' dreams and not by the aspirations of parochial
service desires. That is the wave of the future.
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The development of naval strategy beyond Mahan will be a dynamic process .
Having achieved naval supremacy, our goal now must be to
search of a true Pax Universalis.
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Glossary
ABN Corps

Airborne Corps

AFLD

Airfield

AOA

Amphibious Objective Area

AOR

Area of Responsibility

ARG

Amphibious Ready Group

ARG/MEU

Amphibious Ready Group/
Marine Expeditionary Unit

ASW

Antisubmarine Warfare

CATF/CLF

Commander Amphibious Task Force/
Commander Landing Force

CentCom

Central Command

CinC

Commander in Chief

CinCCentCom

Commander in Chief Central Command

CinCPacFleet

Commander in Chief Pacific Fleet

CMC

Commandant of the Marine Corps

CNO

Chief of Naval Operations

CornMarCent

Commander Marine Component,
Central Command

ComNavCent

Commander Naval Component,

CV

Aircraft Carrier

CVBG

Aircraft Carrier Battle Group

Central Command

CVW

Carrier Air Wing

EW

Electronic Warfare

FEBA

Forward Edge of the Battle Area

FIE

Fly-in-Echelon

FOB

Forward Operating Base

FWE

Fighter Wing Equivalent

GPALS

Global Protection Against Limited Strikes

HNS

Host Nation Support

I&W

Indications and Warning

JCS

Joint Chiefs of Staff

JFACC

Joint Forces Air Component Command

JFC-E

Joint Forces Command-East

JFC-N

Joint Forces Command-North

LAV

Light Armored Vehicles

LCAC

Landing Craft Air Cushion

LCC

Amphibious Command Ship
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LLH

LCAC-LHV Helicopter

MAGTF

Marine Air Ground Task Force

MARCENT

Marines Central Command

MCM

Mine Countermeasures

MEB

Marine Expeditionary Brigade

MED
MEF

Mediterranean

MEU(SOC)

Marine Expeditionary Unit,

Marine Expeditionary Force
Special Operations Capable

MOUT

Military Operations in Urban Terrain

MPF

Maritime Prepositioning Forces

MPS

Maritime Prepositioning Squadron

MRC

Major Regional Contingency

Nato

North Atlantic Treaty Organiztion

NCC

Naval Component Commander

NEF

Naval Expeditionary Force

NETF

Naval Expeditionary Task Force

NEO

Non-Combatant Evacuation Operation

NFCPE

Naval Force Capabilities Planning Effort

OBJ

Objective

PaCom

Pacific Command

PGM

Precision-Guided Munitions

Satcom

Satellite Communications

SEAL

Sea, Air, Land (Team)

SOC

Special Operations Capable

SSN

Nuclear-Powered Attack Submarine

T-AK

Aviation Logistics Ships

TLAM

Tomahawk Land Attack Missile

TAR

Training and Administration of Reserves

TRAP

Tactical Recovery of Aircraft and personnel

USCentCom

U.S. Central Command

USCinCCent

U.S. Commander in Chief Central Command

USCinCPac

U . S . Commander in Chief Pacific Command

WestPac

Western Pacific
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